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I. INTRODUCTION
Both Houses of Congress have passed similar bankruptcy
reform bills,1 and President Bush has signaled he would sign such a
bill ("Reform Act") once Congress reconciles the differences
between the House and Senate versions.2 Among other things, the
Reform Act would create, for the first time, a legislative "safe
harbor" regarding what constitutes a bankruptcy true sale3 in
. As this Article was going to press, the provision of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
that would have reformed "true sale" determination in securitization transactions
was withdrawn by Congress, in response to concerns generally raised by the
Enron debacle about the use of special purpose vehicles. This Article illustrates
that Congress overreacted when withdrawing the "true sale" provision. This
Article also provides an important conceptual framework for further debate on
whether that provision, or one like it, should be included in any future
bankruptcy reform.Professor of Law, Duke Law School; Faculty Director, Duke Global Capital
Markets Center; Professor (Adjunct) of Business Administration, Fuqua School
of Business; and Special Counsel to the law firm of Kaye Scholer LLP. E-mail:
schwarcz@law.duke.edu.
1. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 220, 107th Cong. § 912 (2001);
H.R. 333, 107th Cong. § 912 (2001) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Reform Act of
20011.
2. See In Brief. Senate to Reopen Bankruptcy Bill Issues, AM. BANKER, Jan.
11, 2002; see also Putting the Brakes on Bankruptcy Reform Bill, CONGRESS
DAILY, June 8,2001, at 4; Christopher Lee, Lawmakers Plan to Fight Bankruptcy
Reform Bill: Bush Has Opposed Ending Texas' Homestead Exemption, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Apr. 8,2001.
3. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Parts Are Greater than the Whole: How
Securitization of Divisible Interests Can Revolutionize Structured Finance and
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securitization transactions. Because both bills include identical
forms of this safe harbor provision, it is expected that the Reform
Act will include the safe harbor provision unchanged.
Because of the attacks against our country on September 11,
2001 and the resulting economic downturn, it is uncertain when,
and indeed whether, Congress will enact the Reform Act.' At the
time of this writing, there was some indication that the Reform Act
would be placed back on track.! Even if the Reform Act is not
ultimately enacted in full, it is possible that the provisions that are
identical in both House and Senate versions - such as the
aforesaid securitization safe harbor - may be enacted separately.
II. BACKGROUND
Securitization is reputed to be by far the most rapidly growing
segment of the U.S. credit markets, and its use is rapidly
expanding worldwide.8 In a typical transaction, a company usually
Open the Capital Markets to Middle Market Companies, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L.
REV. 139, 150 (1993) (noting that sales that are effective against creditors and the
estate of a bankrupt originator, in that the property is no longer "property of the
debtor's estate" under Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, are generally
referred to as "true'sales").
4. The Reform Act's true sale "safe harbor" is solely for purposes of
bankruptcy law. Whether a given transfer of receivables constitutes a sale for
tax, accounting, regulatory, reporting, or other purposes is not covered by the
Reform Act.
5. See, e.g., Bill to Alter Bankruptcy Law Remains Stalled, ABI WORLD,
Oct. 19, 2001, at http://www.abiworld.org/headlines/01oct19.html (last visited Oct.
26, 2001) (noting that "with consumer confidence considerably weaker since the
terrorist attacks on September 11, lawmakers' enthusiasm for the legislation may
have dimmed [because] no one in Washington wants to be perceived as anti-
consumer").
6. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Reform May Resurface Before Congress Goes
Home, 38 BANKR. L. NEwSL., Nov. 14, 2001, at 14.
7. See Investment Company Act, Release No. 19105, [1992 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,062, at 83,500 (Nov. 19, 1992). This was provided
in connection with the issuance of Rule 3a-7 under the Investment Company Act
of 1940. Id.
8. See STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, A GUIDE TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION § 8:1 (3d ed. 2002).
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called the "originator" transfers rights to payment from income-
producing assets such as accounts receivable,9 loans, or lease
rentals (collectively, "receivables" or "financial assets") - or
frequently undivided interests in such rights - to a special purpose
vehicle ("SPV").0 The SPV, in turn, issues securities to capital
market investors and uses the proceeds of the issuance to pay for
the receivables. The investors, who are repaid from collections of
the receivables, buy the securities based on their assessments of the
value of the receivables.
Perhaps the most important issue in a securitization is whether
the SPV's investors will continue to be repaid in the event of the
originator's bankruptcy. If the SPV owns the receivables, its
investors will continue to be repaid; if not, their right to be repaid
will be suspended and subject to possible impairment. The SPV
will own the receivables only if the transfer of those receivables
from the originator to the SPV constitutes a sale under applicable
bankruptcy law - usually referred to as a "true sale.""
This issue, and the concerns that surround it, are illustrated by
the recent bankruptcy case of LTV Steel Company, Inc. ("LTV"). 2
LTV challenged its pre-bankruptcy securitization facilities, arguing
that the transfers to the SPVs were not true sales, and therefore,
LTV should be able to use the collections of receivables as "cash
collateral" by giving adequate protection under bankruptcy law.'3
LTV's rationale was that, without such use, it might have to cease
its operations, thereby jeopardizing employee jobs and retiree
benefits and adversely affecting the local economy." The
9. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 11 (6th ed. 1991) (defining account
receivables as an account reflecting a balance owed by a debtor; such as a debt
owed by a customer to an enterprise for goods or services).
10. See id. at 972 (defining a special purpose vehicle, also known as a special-
purpose entity, as "[a] business established to perform no function other than to
develop, own and operate a large complex project... [especially] so as to limit
the number or creditors claiming against the project").
11. See Schwarcz, The Parts Are Greater Than the Whole, supra note 3
(defining a true sale).
12. In re LTV Steel, Inc., No. 00-43866, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 131 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio Feb. 5,2001).
13. Id. at *4-*7.
14. Id. at *4.
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Bankruptcy Court permitted LTV to use these collections pending
resolution of the true sale issue." However, LTV should have little
importance as a legal precedent because, prior to such resolution,
the parties reached a settlement that included a summary finding
that the transfers were true sales. 6 Nonetheless, to some extent,
this use has shaken financial market confidence in securitization.
III. THE REFORM AcT
The Reform Act provides an explicit "true sale" safe harbor
for most transfers of receivables in securitization transactions. It
does this by amending § 541 of the Bankruptcy Code,7 which
defines property of the debtor's estate, to exclude from that estate
any "eligible asset" transferred to an "eligible entity" in connection
with an "asset-backed securitization."'' Because these terms are
expansively defined, the exclusion is broad.
The term "eligible asset," for example, means any existing or
future-arising financial asset, including interests therein and
proceeds thereof, that by their terms convert into cash within a
finite period of time. 9  This would appear to include any
conceivable type of receivable; and the definition's broad
enumeration of examples, as well as the inclusion of (among other
things) residual interests, rights designed to assure servicing, cash,
and securities, is consistent with such an expansive interpretation.
The term "eligible entity" is likewise expansively defined to
mean any entity engaged exclusively (aside from ancillary actions)
in the business of either (1) acquiring and holding eligible assets
(an "issuer"), or (2) acquiring and transferring eligible assets
directly or indirectly to an issuer.2 This should include most SPVs
used, directly or (as in a two-tier structure) indirectly, in
securitization transactions. If, however, the SPV in question has
15. Id. at *5-*6.
16. See SCHWARCZ, STRUCrURED FINANCE, supra note 8, at § 4:1 n.7.
17. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2000).
18. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, supra note 1, § 912(2).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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been used in prior transactions - for example, where the SPV is a
multi-seller securitization conduit - it may be prudent to obtain
assurance that such SPV has engaged exclusively in the foregoing
businesses and actions ancillary thereto.
The Reform Act's safe harbor breaks most dramatically with
existing law when defining the term "transferred."2 Under existing
law, the primary issue is whether a given transfer constitutes a
bankruptcy true sale.' After the Reform Act takes effect, any
transfer in which the debtor represents in writing that the eligible
assets in question are to be "sold, contributed, or otherwise
conveyed with the intention of removing them" from the debtor's
estate will, under bankruptcy law, accomplish such removal.24 The
substantive law criteria of what constitutes a bankruptcy true sale -
such as the amount and nature of the transferee's recourse against
the transferor, and whether the transferor has any right to take
back transferred receivables' - have simply been eliminated.
The final requirement of the safe harbor is that the transfer of
eligible assets to an eligible entity be made "in connection with an
'asset-backed securitization."' 26  This term is broadly defined to
include virtually all transactions that one commonly thinks of as a
22. Id. (amending 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2000)).
23. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(A) (stating that the trustee in bankruptcy may
not avoid a transfer to the extent that the transfer was "intended by the debtor
and the creditor.., to be a contemporaneous exchange for new value given to
the debtor."); see also SCHWARZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 8, at § 4:1.
24. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, supra note 1.
25. See, e.g., Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., Inc., 602
F.2d 538, 544-45 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that whether a transfer of accounts
receivable was a true sale or only the granting of a security interest depended on
the "true nature" of the transaction, including the intentions of the parties (as
demonstrated by their actions), the creditor's right of recourse, and the creditors
right to claim for a deficiency); In re Woodson Co., 813 F.2d 266, 271-72 (9th Cir.
1987) (determining that transactions were loans not sales, because permanent
investors were not subject to any risk when they transferred funds to the debtor,
and because they did not possess "the usual indicia of ownership"); In re Lemons
& Assocs., Inc. 67 B.R. 198, 210 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1986) (looking to "objective
manifestations of the parties 'intent' to determine that a transfer was a sale
transaction and not a loan").
26. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, supra note 1 (amending 11 U.S.C. §
541(b) by adding paragraph (8)).
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securitization - that is, all transactions in which the transferred
receivables are used as the source of payment on securities - so
long as "at least one class or tranche of [those securities] was rated
investment grade by one or more nationally recognized securities
rating organizations, when the securities were initially issued."2"
The reference to "nationally recognized securities rating
organizations"' appears to be a misnomer; the correct reference
should be to Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations ("NRSROs")."9 This requirement essentially means
that a major rating agency, such as Standard & Poor's, Moody's, or
Fitch, has rated at least one class or slice of the issuer's securities
investment grade in order for the safe harbor to apply.
Where the safe harbor applies, it also resolves the difficult
issue of whether a transfer that otherwise constitutes a sale would
fail because only a partial interest in receivables is being
transferred." In many securitization transactions, the SPV
purchases undivided interests in receivables. The rationale for
buying undivided interests is that it maximizes the statistical
diversification of the receivables sold to the SPV and also permits
the SPV to invest in newly arising receivables by simple
readjustment of the SPV's fractional interest.3' The undivided
27. Id. (amending 11 U.S.C. § 541 by adding a subsection (f)(1)).
28. See id. at § 912 (2001).
29. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The
Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 1 (2002) (analyzing NRSROs).
30. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Intermediary Risk in a Global Economy, 50
DUKE L. J. 1541 (2001), accord, 1 SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS § 3.09
(Jason H. P. Kravitt, ed., 2d ed. 1999 & 2000-1 Supplement) (observing that "[it
is also possible to argue that a court will more likely find a sale of a discrete
group of receivables than a sale of an undivided interest in a pool to be a true
sale, though there is no obvious analytical reason that this must be so").
31. Undivided interests are widely used, for example, in collateralized loan
obligation and bank credit card securitizations. See SECURITIZATION OF
FINANCIAL ASSETS, supra note 30, at § 3.03[A] (noting that the advantage of the
undivided interest structure when securitizing pools of medium term receivables
is "that one may avoid the transaction costs associated with numerous separate
purchases"); id. at § 3-14 (observing that "mortgage-backed securitizations are
generally handled using the [undivided interest] structure"); id. at §§ 3.14-16
(observing that securitization of credit card receivables also generally uses the
undivided interest structure); id. at § 3.17 (recognizing that "[tihe most
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nature of the SPV's interest, however, raises concern because the
law has generally been unsettled as to whether the transfer of a
partial interest in receivables can constitute a true sale. 2 The
Reform Act's safe harbor eliminates this concern by applying to
the sale of "interests" in receivables.33
IV. SCOPE OF THE REFORM ACT
The Reform Act's safe harbor provision will apply to all
bankruptcy and analogous state-law cases commenced thereafter.
Existing law on true sale characterization will continue to apply,
however, in all bankruptcy and analogous state-law cases
commenced before the Reform Act's enactment.3"
The Reform Act does not purport to resolve all bankruptcy
issues associated with securitization. For example, the Act
continues to permit a transferor's trustee in bankruptcy to avoid a
transfer of receivables that may be recovered as a fraudulent
conveyance under § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code.35 This should not
be significant, however, because it is rare in securitization
transactions for such transfers to be avoided: "[T]he buyer of
financial assets normally will have paid reasonably equivalent
value for the assets.,
36
Transfers may also be avoided where the transferor and
transferee are substantively consolidated pursuant to the equitable
powers of a bankruptcy court under § 105 of the Bankruptcy
practicable structure [for securitization of trade receivables] has been the
purchase of an undivided, fractional interest in a pool of receivables").
32. See, e.g., Peter V. Pantaleo et al., Rethinking the Role of Recourse in the
Sale of Financial Assets, 52 Bus. LAW. 159 (1996); Schwarcz, The Parts Are
Greater Than the Whole, supra note 3, at 150 (1993) (referring to the "unfounded
perception that the transfer of only a partial interest in a future payment
stream... cannot be a true sale").
33. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, supra note 1.
34. See, e.g., SCHWARCZ, STRUCrURED FINANCE, supra note 8, at 28-35.
35. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, supra note 1, § 912 (following the
line of thought that § 912 only would amend § 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, thus
other Bankruptcy Code sections, such as § 548, would continue to be applicable).
36. See Pantaleo, supra note 32, at 185.
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Code.' Even though the transfer may be effective when viewed in
isolation, substantive consolidation treats the transferee and
transferor as the same entity in bankruptcy. Again, this risk
appears minimal because substantive consolidation is a risk that
can be controlled in securitization transactions by maintaining
appropriate formalities between the transferor and transferee.
It nonetheless is likely that bankruptcy counsel will, as under
present law, be asked to opine on the possibility of substantive
consolidation. Counsel also may be asked to opine that the
transfer of receivables is not a fraudulent conveyance, and that the
constituent elements of the safe harbor (i.e., that the receivables
are "eligible assets" that have been "transferred" to an "eligible
entity" in connection with an "asset-backed securitization") have
been achieved.
As wide as the safe harbor is, there are significant exceptions.
For example, securitization transactions that lack NRSRO-
investment grade ratings, such as unrated private placements or
private placements relying on National Association of Insurance
Commissioners ratings, are not covered." Bankruptcy counsel then
will need to address the traditional true sale criteria. Also, because
the Reform Act only purports to resolve the true sale question for
transferors that become debtors under U.S. bankruptcy law,39 that
question will continue to have vitality for cross-border
securitization transactions involving non-U.S. transferors.
V. CONCLUSION
Once the Reform Act becomes effective, the question of
whether a given transfer of receivables will constitute a true sale
for bankruptcy will be readily answered in the affirmative for a
broad range of securitization transactions. Within this range, the
37. 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2000).
38 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, supra note 1 (defining a security in
an asset securitization as one that has been rated investment grade by one or
more nationally recognized securities rating organizations when the security was
initially issued).
39. See generally id.
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concerns raised by the LTV case' should be greatly mitigated. If,
for example, a debtor argues that a transfer made in a
securitization transaction is not a true sale, the issue can be
promptly resolved by examining the transactional documentation."
Furthermore, because the safe harbor criteria allow virtually no
judicial discretion, it should be irrelevant that a court (as in LTV)
is influenced by the debtor's argument that it may have to cease its
operations, thereby jeopardizing jobs and the local economy."
The safe harbor provision also might provide a basis to do
away with the present need in many securitization transactions for
a two-tier structure. If so, that would significantly reduce
transaction costs and potentially extend the benefits of
securitization to smaller companies. The primary purpose of a
two-tier structure is to "avoid the risk that recourse [to the
transferor] might disqualify true sale treatment for a transfer."'43
For transactions within the safe harbor, however, recourse is no
longer a relevant criterion for sale treatment. Thus, the originator
may be able to transfer its receivables, in a simplified "one-tier"
structure, directly to a non-affiliated SPV that issues the securities
and has recourse against the originator. If the originator also has
the right to take back any surplus collections once the transaction
has ended, the one-tier structure may replace the two-tier
structure. The only proviso is that an originator seeking "off-
balance sheet" treatment of its transfer of receivables would need
40. In re LTV Steel, Inc., No. 00-43866, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 131 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio Feb. 5, 2001).
41. A debtor nonetheless might argue that the securitization safe harbor is
unconstitutional, in that the Supreme Court has ruled that "[p]roperty interests
are created and defined by state law. Unless some federal interest requires a
different result, there is no reason why such interests should be analyzed
differently simply because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy
proceeding." Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979). One would think,
however, that the Reform Act itself constitutes the requisite "federal interest"
requiring a different result.
42. Indeed, the true sale safe harbor should not be viewed as undermining
the policies of bankruptcy law. Cf Pantaleo, supra note 32, at 185-89 (arguing
that the concept of a true sale with recourse for collectibility should not
undermine these policies).
43. See id. at 162.
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to clear the one-tier structure with its accountants. It is arguable,
however, that at least some one-tier structures should be able to
qualify for off-balance sheet treatment.44
My colleagues on the panel at the Two Shocks to the
Bankruptcy Symposium, 4 Mark A. Speiser, Edward J. Janger,
Kenneth C. Kettering and Lois R. Lupica oppose the Reform Act's
legislative safe harbor for securitization. Professor Janger argues
that he is not sure that securitization is uniformly economically
efficient, whereas the existing "muddy" rules on true sale create an
opportunity for judicial sorting and also "tax" securitization
transactions at the margin.' Professor Lupica argues that the safe
harbor provides participants in securitization with a degree of
44. Off-balance sheet accounting for securitization transactions are governed
in the United States, for transfers occurring after March 31, 2001, by Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards No. 140 (FAS 140). ACCOUNTING FOR
TRANSFERS AND SERVICING OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND EXTINGUISHMENTS OF
LIABILITIES, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 140 (Financial
Accounting Standards Bd. 2001). FAS 140 generally requires that (a) the
transferred receivables be put presumptively beyond the reach of the transferor
and its creditors, even in bankruptcy; (b) if the transferee is a qualifying special
purpose entity ("SPE"), each holder of its beneficial interests (i.e., its securities)
has the right to pledge or exchange those interests; and (c) the transferor does
not have the ability to unilaterally cause the holder to return specific assets, other
than through a cleanup call. Id. These conditions may well be satisfied in some
one-tier structures. The first condition would be explicitly satisfied by the
Reform Act's safe harbor. The second condition (b) should be feasible because,
in practice, many SPVs that constitute "eligible entities" under the Reform Act
may also constitute "qualifying SPEs" under FAS 140. See id. § 35 (setting forth
the criteria of a qualifying SPE). Additionally, each holder of the SPV's
securities would normally have the right to pledge or exchange those assets. Cf.
id. § 173. Condition (c) also should be feasible because FAS 140 interprets the
phrase "unilaterally" to permit a transferor, consistent with sale accounting, to
retain the right to remove defaulted receivables from the SPV, and also permits
the transferor to remove cash collections of receivables. See id. §§ 87.b, 189, 42,
43, 35.d.
45. This Article is a reflection of the authors remarks at the Eugene P and
Delia S. Murphy Conference on Corporate Law, entitled, "Two Shocks to the
Bankruptcy System" held at Fordham University School of Law on November
15, 2001.
46. See Edward J. Janger, Muddy Rules for Securitization, 7 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 301 (2002).
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protection and immunity from the normal operation of the
bankruptcy system at the expense of other creditors and debtors
that seek to reorganize under the shelter of the bankruptcy laws.'7
My colleagues' arguments raise, of course, the larger question
of whether securitization is efficient and fair. I believe, and have
argued, that it is.' A summary analysis nonetheless follows.
Securitization merely replaces one type of asset, receivables,
with another type, cash.49 Unsecured creditors have the same
amount of unencumbered assets to levy against after the
securitization as they did before the securitization. Some may
argue that securitization could hurt creditors where the cash
received is wasted by the originator. But one cannot assume
wasteful behavior simply because an originator sells its receivables
for cash. In fact, given the scrutiny imposed by rating agencies,
securitization may present fewer opportunities for such behavior
than other financing methods.0
Nonetheless, securitization, just like any other sale of assets by
47. See Lois R. Lupica, Revised Article 9, The Proposed Bankruptcy Code
Amendments, and Securitizing Debtors and Their Creditors, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP.
& FIN. L. 321 (2002).
48. My colleagues on this panel argue that there is no empirical study of
whether securitization is efficient, and therefore it should be limited. But it
would seem that for a type of financing as important and widespread as
securitization, those attempting to set limits should bear the burden of producing
persuasive empirical evidence that securitization is inefficient. See Claire A. Hill,
Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1061
(1996); see also Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN.
J. L., Bus. & FIN. 133 (1994); SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 8,
App. A. But cf Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured
Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 DuKE L.J. 425, 428 (1997) (arguing that those
attempting to set limits on secured credit should bear the burden of producing
persuasive empirical evidence that such credit is not efficient).
49. See SCHWARTZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 8, at § 1:1.
50. In this context, I have shown that even though proceeds of secured
borrowing can likewise be wasted or unwisely invested, unsecured creditors,
given a choice ex ante the borrowing, would want the debtor to be able to
borrow. Schwarcz, The Easy Case, supra note 48, at 83 (1997). Because
securitization similarly provides liquidity to a debtor, indeed at a lower cost than
secured borrowing, unsecured creditors given a choice ex ante likewise would
want the debtor to be able to engage in a securitization transaction.
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an originator, may become suspect if implemented when an
originator is on the brink of bankruptcy. The potential for such
suspect actions, however, is not unique to securitization
transactions. The same issues would arise, for example, if on the
eve of bankruptcy an originator sold, or borrowed money by
encumbering, a factory or equipment and similarly sought to
dissipate the sale or loan proceeds. Such questionable uses of
proceeds are more appropriately addressed by preference and
fraudulent conveyance laws.
Moreover, securitization increases overall value by providing a
new source of financing, the capital markets, whose rates are
systematically lower than the rates at which many companies
commonly borrow. So long as the added transaction costs are less
than the interest saved by using securitization instead of secured
financing, there is a net gain.
This begs the question, however, why the capital markets
should be prepared to fund securitization transactions at a lower
rate than secured financing. It is because a securitization based on
a "true sale" effectively can separate the source of payment of the
SPV's securities from the risks associated with the originator,
largely eliminating the need for investors to monitor the
originator's financial condition. Although the risks associated with
servicing and collecting the receivables still necessitate some
monitoring, these risks are borne by providers of credit
enhancement or investors in subordinated securities, parties who
are in the business of precisely assessing and absorbing such risks.
However, all other things being equal, the safe harbor for
securitization proposed in the Bankruptcy Reform Act to some
extent would act counter to the bankruptcy goal of debtor
rehabilitation. That is because the safe harbor would prevent a
court from re-characterizing a securitization "sale" as a secured
loan5 even though, "in a reorganization case, the financial assets of
a business are often a prime source of collateral for debtor-in-
possession financing."'52  But other things are not equal. For
51. Once sold, a debtor's receivables could no longer be used as collateral for
debtor-in-possession financing.
52 See Pantaleo, supra note 32, at 186.
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example, "the proceeds of the [securitization] may have provided
liquidity to help a debtor stave off an earlier bankruptcy filing" or
"could allow sufficient liquidity to [help the debtor] avoid
bankruptcy altogether."53  The safe harbor also would help to
"preserv[e] reasonable commercial expectations that insure
efficiency and predictability in the marketplace."54  For these
reasons, I favor, on balance, the Bankruptcy Reform Act's safe
harbor.
53. Id. at 187.
54. Id. at 189.
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